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Among the notable achievements of the post-1978 regime in China,a prominent one is its oft-proclaimed victory in facilitating the es-cape from dire poverty of several hundred million persons. Though
not all researchers agree as to the magnitude of the success, certainly major
change has taken place. (1) But even as this reduction of destitution has oc-
curred, income inequality in the country has increased substantially since
the mid-1990s, with the nationwide Gini coefficient having leapt from
about 0.40 at that point up to almost 0.50 by 2015. (2) What has been hap-
pening in regard to a state-led effort to cater to the poverty-stricken there-
fore deserves attention. A point of special concern might be how residual
poverty is being addressed in the current regime of Xi Jinping.
Most investigation of Chinese privation has focused on the phenomenon
of poverty itself (and often on rural poverty in particular), or else on the ef-
ficacy of particular efforts at eliminating or reducing indigence. (3) Not much
attention has been given to the details of the one specific policy examined
here, the Minimum Livelihood Guarantee (MLG) (zuidi shenghuo baozhang
最低生活保障) or, for short, the dibao (低保), much less to how it might
have been adjusted over time. I argue that this program has been manipu-
lated and reshaped more than once to bring it into sync with larger policy
goals – goals quite unrelated to combating impoverishment. The mission
of this article is to substantiate this claim. I do this by examining five mu-
tations injected into the program in just the past couple years, tracing back
to the autumn of 2012, when Xi was soon to take up his duties. 
Indeed, such changes in the scheme have been both subtle and obvious,
and those I target are the following: 1) requiring that the labour-capable go
to work, instead of collecting welfare allowances (as many had been doing);
2) emphasising the destitute and desperate as the “keypoint” (zhongdian
重点) recipients of relief; 3) zeroing in on corruption; 4) calculating appli-
cants’ total household assets in assessing eligibility for the allowances; and
5) privileging the rural areas in funding. I contrast each of the five new post-
Xi initiatives with what the MLG initiative, first promulgated in 1999, ini-
tially put forth as its aims and its mechanics. I present shifts in the regime’s
allocation of allowances – and alterations in the amounts of funding for
the allowances – over the years, to chart changes in the policies informing
its execution. In conclusion, I highlight how the program has been rewritten
repeatedly and utilised politically in line with various, often “stability”-ori-
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Manipulating China’s “Minimum
Livelihood Guarantee”
Political Shifts in a Program for the Poor in the Period of Xi Jinping
DOROTHY J .  SOLINGER
ABSTRACT: In 1999, the State Council set forth an urban social assistance program aimed chiefly at pacifying protesting laid-off workers and
compensating for the breakdown of the work-unit-based welfare benefits that had obtained under the planned economy. While an initial goal
was to ensure the political stability that would allow enterprise reform to proceed unchallenged, over time the content of the scheme shifted in
line with new regime goals. First the program spread to the countryside, as the New Socialist Countryside model was installed. In the past few
years, in line with a tightening of financial commitment, leaders have demanded that the able-bodied poor should work, not be succoured, and
that the program’s allowances target the desperate. Also, beginning in 2014 and continuing into 2016 there has been heavy emphasis on figh-
ting graft and corruption in the program. The paper details five alterations that have emerged – or policy slants for which earlier, less extreme
changes in implementation have intensified – since Xi Jinping ascended to power. The big message here is that the regime has repeatedly res-
haped this initiative to match the changing political agenda of the Party. 
KEYWORDS: poverty, social assistance, minimum livelihood guarantee, dibao, corruption, unemployment.
ented, objectives of the moment. Examining whether other public policy
programs have been similarly rewritten to match the larger goals of the Xi
regime would be an interesting project, but one beyond the scope of this
analysis.
Most of the research in this paper was done with government documents
and online articles. I also conducted (or supervised) in-home interviews with
recipients of the dibao during summer from 2007 through 2013 (nearly 100
households in eight cities – Xi’an, Wuhan, Lanzhou, Shanghai, and
Guangzhou, plus three Hubei prefectural cities: Jingzhou, Qianjiang, and 
Xiantao), with a few city officials (in Wuhan and Lanzhou, both in 2007),
with community (shequ社区) leaders in every community I and my assis-
tants visited, and with scholars who work on issues of urban poverty and
welfare. I conducted the interviews in all cases except for in 2010 in
Guangzhou and in 2007 in some of the Wuhan communities, sometimes
with a translator and always (except once in Lanzhou in 2010) with com-
munity officials listening. When I was not present at the conversations I ob-
tained transcripts of the talks from the students who assisted me and I then
translated these. I made my contacts in various ways, but always from local
scholars I knew in each city. The interviews were open-ended, and commu-
nity leaders always selected the households to be interviewed.
Background of the dibao program
Urban social assistance in PRC cities goes back to the 1950s with the in-
stitution of a program entitled the “three withouts” (sanwu 三无), which
referred to those with no source of livelihood, no legal supporter, and no
work ability. That scheme sufficed for an era in which most urban dwellers
were employed and serviced by their firms (danwei 单位). An embarrassingly
tiny pittance was doled out to this set of destitute-in-one-of-three-ways.
As the country’s political economy shifted from state planning in the
1980s and 1990s, the plants that made up the industrial portion of that
economy were forced to cope with an unaccustomed market. And as that
old model of business arrangement began to falter and crumble under
the onset of rivalry between state-owned and private, collective and for-
eign factories that had no welfare responsibilities, the state-funded en-
terprise social security system cracked apart, completely unable to
cope, (4) such that tens of millions of workers were abruptly cast aside,
making a new welfare model a necessity. According to Athar Hussain, as
many as 68.9 million jobs were “sacrificed” to the economic marketisa-
tion project between 1994-2003, if one adds up all those in state- and
collectively-owned sectors in enterprises, public institutions, and the gov-
ernment. (5) Besides introducing competition, market economics in-
creased both the price level and the scale of fees that beset the public. (6)
Initial efforts to handle the extremities of the people who had been
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Table 1 – Dibao expenditures, GDP, Government expenditures, and Dibao expenditures as percentage of















as % of government
expenditures
1999 1.5 1.5 n.a. 9,018.70 0.016 1,318.8 0.1
2000 2.7 2.7 n.a. 9,977.60 0.03 1,588.6 0.2
2001 5.4 5.4 n.a. 11,027.00 0.038 1,890.3 0.3
2002 10.9 10.9 n.a. 12,100 0.0875 2,205.3 0.5
2003 15.1 15.1 n.a. 13,656 0.1106 2,465 0.6
2004 17.3 17.3 n.a. 16,071 0.107 2,848.7 0.6
2005 21.73 19.2 2.53 18,590 0.117 3,393 0.6
2006 26.7 22.4 4.3 21,766 0.123 4,042.3 0.7
2007 37.9 27.5 10.41 26,802 0.141 4,978.1 0.8
2008 61.5 39.3 22.23 31,675.20 0.194 6,259.3 1
2009 82.7 48.2 34.5 34,563 0.239 7,630 1.1
2010 97 52.5 44.5 40,890.3 0.237 8,987.4 1.1
2011 132.77 66 66.77 48,412.40 0.274 10,924.8 1.2
2012 139.2 67.4 71.8 53,412 0.261 12,595.3 1.1
2013 162.39 75.7 86.69 58,802.00 0.277 14,021.2 1.2
2014 159.2 72.2 87.03 63,646.30 0.25 15,178.6 1
2015 141.47 n.a n.a 67,670.08 0.2 17,576.8 0.8
Source: For government expenditures and GDP: Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojia tongjiju bian (Chinese People’s Republic National Statistical Bureau (ed.)), Zhongguo tongji
nianjian (China Statistical Yearbook), Beijing, Zhongguo tongji chubanshe (China Statistics Press), China Data Online, Selected years, http://chinadataonline.org/member/year-
booknew/yearbook/Ayblist.aspx (accessed on 8 November 2016). For dibao expenditures: Ministry of Civil Affairs Yearbook, China Data Online, selected years, http://china-
dataonline.org/member/yearbooknew/yearbook/Ayblist.aspx (accessed on 8 November 2016). For 2015, calculated from “2015 nian Zhongguo guonei shengchan zongzhi
(GDP) tongji shuju” (Statistical data on China’s 2015 GDP), http://www.360doc.com/content/16/0119/16/502486_529117704.shtml (accessed on 8 November 2016) (for
GDP) and “2015 nian 1-11 yue quanguo leiji zhichu chengxiang dibao zijin 1414.7 yi” (From January to November 2015, the accumulated expenditure of urban and rural mini-
mum livelihood guarantee was 141.47 billion yuan); http://www.askci.com/news/finance/2015/12/30/163331xfkf.shtml (accessed on 8 November 2016) (for total national ex-
penditure on the dibao).
pushed from their work posts failed to assemble the required resources
to meet the need. (7)
By the early 1990s, Shanghai’s leaders had become aware of the protest
upheaval against job losses already underway in the Northeast. (8) Hoping
to forestall such disorder in their own metropolis, Shanghai’s politicians de-
veloped the dibao to tend to their city’s discarded labour. (9) By the mid-
1990s, many cities nationwide were following suit, and in 1997 the State
Council issued a draft document setting up a national urban residents’ Min-
imum Livelihood Guarantee System. (10) Two years later, that draft became
the formal set of regulations specifying the program’s rules and proce-
dures. (11)
The program (12)
This program’s stated aims were to “maintain the basic living standard
for urban residents,” defined as meeting the “necessary costs of food,
clothes, and housing, giv[ing] reasonable consideration to water and
power and fuel bills, and [providing for] the educational costs for chil-
dren.” (13) Soon after then-Premier Zhu Rongji had signed the authorising
order, a Ministry of Civil Affairs official referred to the project as meant
to “perfect the traditional social relief system [a reference to the “three-
withouts” program], establish a wholesome modern social welfare sys-
tem, and guarantee that the economic system reform, especially the
state enterprise reform, could progress without incident (shunli jinbu顺
利进步).” (14) Besides, at that point China was soon to join the World
Trade Organisation, which it did in December 2001. Many Chinese policy
analysts expected that this accession would lead to millions more work-
ers being thrown from their plants, as international competition from
better-made products overcame their employers’ ability to stay
afloat. (15)
Dependence on localities let each city work out a “scientific determi-
nation” of its own local poverty line or norm (dibao biaozhun低保标准),
based on its economic conditions, its residents’ basic livelihood needs,
its price level, its degree of development, and its financial ability to con-
tribute to the program. (16) In an endeavour to iron out inter-urban dis-
parities, in 1999 the central government stepped in to subsidise the more
indigent cities, such that the portion born by localities varied signifi-
cantly.
Yet, alarmed by ongoing demonstrations by the laid-off even after that
boost, in 2001 Premier Zhu called for an enormous on-the-ground survey
of the plight of the furloughed throughout the country, involving some
800,000 officials, including himself. (17) The insufficiencies uncovered (both
in the size of the allowances and in the miniscule number of recipients) led
him to order a massive increase in funding and in the number served, with
investment leaping from 1.5 billion yuan in 1999 to 10.5 billion by 2002, as
beneficiaries ballooned from 2.8 million in 1999 to 19.3 million in the latter
year (see tables 1 and 2). By the early 2000s, large-scale central governmen-
tal transfers had reversed an initial reliance on often inadequate local bud-
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Table 2 – Number of dibao participants, urban and
rural, 1999-2015 (in millions)
Year Urban Rural Total
1999 2.8 n.a. 2.8
2000 3.24 n.a. 3.24
2001 11.7 n.a. 11.7
July 2002 19.3 n.a. 19.3
Dec. 2002 20.6 4.08 24.68
2003 22.5 3.7 26.2
2004 22.1 4.9 27
2005 22.3 8.25 30.55
2006 22.4 15.93 38.33
2007 22.7 35.66 58.36
2008 23.3 42.84 66.14
2009 23.5 47.6 70.6
2010 22.9 52.28 75.18
2011 22.8 53.06 75.86
2012 21.4 53.45 74.85
2013 20.6 53.82 73.88
2014 18.77 52.07 70.84
2015 17.22 49.33 66.55
Source: Zhongguo minzheng tongji nianjian (China Civil Affairs Statistical Yearbook),






for 2013 and 2014 accessed 13 June 2016). For 2015: http://www.askci.com/news/fi-
nance/2015/12/30/163331xfkf.shtml.
gets. (18) Notable was an intent to provision even families where there was
one person with a job, a feature of the days when disturbances were legion
in the city streets and lanes. Later, we will see, this feature was erased.
Character of outlays
That the dibao program is ungenerous in comparative terms becomes ev-
ident when considering the percentage of GDP devoted to the scheme, a
statistic significant because it symbolises the level of largesse a government
is willing to shower on its poor. In China that percentage for the urban dibao
has wavered around 0.12% (19) (reaching a high of 0.14% in 2009, during
the financial crisis) after rising from under 0.1%, where it stood before 2003.
Relative to average urban incomes (reported as “average disposable income”
in state statistical accounts) the amounts have always been pitiable, but
ratios declined with time (see tables 3-4). Even with the funds for the rural
dibao (instituted in 2007) added in, the two allowances together amounted
to just 0.20% of GDP in 2015 (20) (see table 1). By contrast, the percentage
for targeted poverty programs elsewhere ranged from 0.5 to 1% in Latin
America in the early 2000s (21) to an average 2.5% of GDP for cash transfer
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as % of average
disposable income
Beijing 290 1038.67 28 300 1471.08 20.39
Tianjin 241 778.17 31 265 1053.25 25.16
Shenyang 205 587.5 35 220 841.5 26.14
Dalian 221 683.33 32 240 999.5 24.01
Changchun 169 575 29 169 838.75 20.15
Harbin 200 583.67 34 200 838.75 23.85
Taiyuan 156 614.67 25 183 873 20.96
Jinan 208 748.42 28 230 1131.5 20.33
Qingdao* 205 726.75 28 260 1076.67 24.15
Shanghai 280 1104.17 25 300 1553.75 19.31
Hangzhou* 285 981.5 29 300 1383.42 21.69
Nanjing 220 763.08 29 230 1249.75 18.40
Wuhan 210 651.67 32 220 904.17 24.33
Changsha* 190 751.75 25 200 1036.17 19.30
Chongqing 185 603.17 31 210 853.67 24.60
Chengdu 178 747.67 24 195 946.58 20.60
Xi’an 156 598.67 26 200 802.33 24.93
Lanzhou 172 n.a. n.a. 190 710.75 26.73
Shenzhen* 317 2078.42 15 344 1791.17 [sic.] 19.21
Xiamen* 290 980.67 30 290 1366.92 21.22
Guangzhou       300 1115 27 330 1523.92 21.65
Average 28 23.3
July 2002 September 2005
*Statistic is the average of upper and lower statistics for the dibao norm for given city in that year.
Source: For the 2002 dibao norm, “Quanguo 36ge chengshi zuidi baozhang biaozhun yilan” (General survey of 36 cities’ minimum livelihood guarantee norm),
http://china.com.cn/city/txt/2006-11/25/content_7406758_2.htm (accessed on 17 August 2007); For 2002 disposable income, Chengdu Statistical Yearbook 2003, China data
online, http://chinadataonline.org/member/yearbooknew/yearbook/Aayearbook.aspx?ybcode=E4525D33ACDD03B398C8D9FD6C820120&key=en (accessed on 8 November
2016); For the 2005 dibao norm, “Quanguo 36ge chengshi zuidi baozhang biaozhun yilan” (General survey of 36 cities’ minimum livelihood guarantee norm),
http://china.com.cn/city/txt/2006-11/25/content_740675\hich\af0\dbch\af13\loch\f0 8_2.htm (accessed on 17 August 2007); 
For 2005 urban residents’ average disposable income, Chengdu Statistical Yearbook 2005, China data online
http://chinadataonline.org/member/yearbooknew/yearbook/Aayearbook.asp x?ybcode=E4525D33ACDD03B31C9FB8AB6B7C9295&key=en (accessed on 8 November 2016);
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programs. Mexico was investing 0.3% as of 2008, and Indonesia’s similar
program cost 0.5% of its GDP in 2005. (22)
As a mark of the program’s inadequacy – a sign that one should note more
than just the numbers pulled up from poverty – by the mid-2000s, as many
as 7.7% of the total urban-registered population had a net income below
the relevant dibao line in their cities of registration. And yet the program
was serving only about 22.5 million urban people at the time, or under 4%
of the country’s city population. Thus, only about half of those eligible for
it were receiving the dibao. Besides that malfunction, “leakage” had resulted
in an absurd situation in which “about 40% of the [program’s actual] recip-
ients [were] in fact [people] ineligible to get it.” Besides, it was discovered,
“29% of all poor urban people [without specifying how a figure for the total
poor was derived] were getting the dibao.” (23)
Things did improve: by 2007, 39% of the eligible poor were receiving the
dibao, when just 1.2% of the non-poor were. (24) Thereafter, the number of
urban recipients climbed to 23.5 million at the program’s peak in 2009;
within five years, however, at year-end 2015, the number had fallen to just
17.22 million in the cities. Adding up the beneficiaries in urban and rural
areas together for that year, the national total amounted to 66.5 million, (25)
a significant decline of from 2011’s peak of 75.86 million (26) (see table 2).
And yet, this drop did not necessarily signify that indigence was disappear-
ing: the poverty expert Peter Townsend estimated in 2009, at the height of
the program’s generosity, that, “If the poverty line were drawn 50% higher
than the very stringent threshold in fact adopted, the official figure of 4.7%
[of the urban population] in poverty becomes 20% of the city population, or
nearly 90 million in urban areas.” (27) In another analysis, as of late 2012/early
2013, more than 30 million urbanites should have been counted in the cat-
egory of the poor as a conservative estimate, (28) at a time when just 21.4 mil-
lion city people were receiving welfare, i.e., only about 70% of those who
should have been on the rolls, according to one account. After a rise, the num-
bers of recipients (dibaohu低保户) gradually dropped off in the countryside,
too: just before the program’s official extension into the agricultural regions
in 2007, beneficiaries stood at just 15.9 million; (29) they increased speedily
once the scheme was in place, going from 35.66 million in 2007 up to 53.8
million in 2013, but then falling to 49.3 million in the next year (table 2). 
My data suggest that, despite the rural add-on, the program as a whole
has been downplayed over time as the out-of-work have quieted down.
True, the absolute sums of the dibao norms (poverty lines) and the actual
subsidies delivered to the poor (or meant to be delivered) have increased
in value in the cities: the average urban norm rose from 152 yuan per person
per month in 2004 to 441 yuan in 2014. And the average actual hand-out
(that is, the sum households received, the gap between the local poverty
line and recipients’ own household income) went from 65 yuan per person
per month on average in 2004 to 286 yuan in allowance received 10 years
later. Too, local administrations have been finding make-work positions for
the unemployed, such as sweeping the lanes of community courtyards,
standing “guard” at the gates of these quarters, and peeling shreds of old
notices from the common walls.
But a metric of another sort tells a different story. Over the years, the av-
erage urban dibao norm has come to represent a steadily declining percent-
age of the average disposable income of ordinary (non-dibaohu) city folk
nationwide. It has also amounted to a falling percentage of the average
state factory wage. Thus, in 2002 and 2005, the mean dibao norm (poverty
line) across urban China represented 28% and 23% of the average monthly
per capita disposable income in large cities, respectively (Table 3). By
November 2011, however, the proportion of urban incomes stood at a mere
15.8% (table 4).
As for wages, in 1998, the average dibao norm nationally equalled 20.5%
of the mean wage in the largest cities. But by 2007 that proportion had
sunk by a full 50%, down to 10.3% of the average wage. In 2011, the norm
amounted to a tiny 7.8% of the mean wage in state firms. (30)
Another kind of calculation reveals a second way the dibao appears to
have diminished significance for budget writers: in 2007, urban dibao ex-
penditures accounted for 0.113% of GDP, a proportion that rose in 2008,
but up to just 0.128% (during the Great Recession). In 2012, however, the
percentage dropped down to just 0.108% (table 5). One could argue, of
course, that GDP was rising, along with average incomes. But this exercise
draws attention not to absolute figures but rather to how relative alloca-
tions were figured. Overall, one could conclude that provisioning the poor
has dropped in significance.
Thus, it does appear that the scheme (as well as its initial target and ob-
jective – to keep the laid-off quiet to avoid wrecking enterprise restructur-
ing) has constituted a lesser concern for central-level decision-makers in
recent years than it did more than a decade ago, when raucous discharged
workers thronged the roads. This is in line with Lynette Ong’s work showing
that, whereas protests related to state-owned enterprise labour disputes
accounted for over 37% of 18 different grievance types in 2003, in the years
2010 to 2012 these disturbances amounted to just 6.3 to 8.4%. (31) The work
of Eli Friedman also charts a drop-off in labour disputes from 2008-2011. (32)
But even as the program’s import may be diminished, it has not escaped
central-level attention. Apparently it is deemed worthy of enough deliber-
ation to have been altered to match Xi’s larger objectives, and in five dif-
ferent ways. I proceed to document this claim.
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Change in policy 
Beginning near the end of 2012, a slew of new restrictions and regulations,
already brewing for several years, became formal policy. The initial sign was
a State Council “Opinion” in late September 2012 containing mandates ei-
ther novel to the program or present but much less accentuated earlier. The
first was a change in emphasis, demanding the arrangement of employment
– not an offer of allowances – for the able-bodied impecunious. Secondly,
it urged localities to take the seriously/chronically diseased and disabled,
the totally destitute, and the deserted, in short, those who amounted to
the recipients of the former “three-withouts” policy, as the “keypoint” of
assistance. The third alteration was that, while appealing not just for stabil-
ity, the document also beamed a spotlight on local cadre corruption and
misappropriation of funds, along with calls for stepped-up auditing and su-
pervision against these misbehaviours. The official press perceived such flaws
as rampant in the conduct of the scheme.
Fourth, like the third change displaying suspicion of malfeasance, the
September 2012 Opinion for the first time ordered that total household as-
sets (bank savings, securities, and other financial assets, vehicles, and hous-
ing) be taken into account in assessing a family’s eligibility to receive the
dibao. The intent was undoubtedly to uncover hidden sources of wealth.
The upshot was that now one’s local residence registration, his/her family
income, and, in addition, the amount of his/her household assets have be-
come the three basic conditions for obtaining the allowance. (33) And lastly,
a fifth new emphasis has emerged: poor people resident in the rural areas
have now received relative priority over those in the cities.
First change: Those able to work must work
The first alteration amounts to a call to cut off from – and not admit to
– the rolls anyone capable of work but merely unemployed. This mandate
helps account for the drop in percentage that the unemployed represent
among all dibaohu in the past few years (see below). This modification can
be distinguished from the dibao’s inaugurating 1999 Regulations, where
meeting just three conditions qualified one for aid: 1) being one of the
“three withouts”; 2) being unemployed, with one’s term for drawing unem-
ployment relief having ended, but unable to get reemployed, and having a
family average income below the local poverty standard; or 3) being at
work, laid-off, or retired, but with all sources of income combined still in-
sufficient to bring household average income up to the local poverty line.
No mention was made in 1999 about whether a person was capable of
working. According to Joe Leung and Yuebin Xu, in practice only two re-
quirements really mattered: having an income below the local poverty line,
and possessing household registration in the city where one applied. (34)
Besides, that earlier document made only passing reference to working: it
just prescribed “encourage[ing] labour self-support.” Government yearbooks
show that in 2002, when the numbers of “laid-off” (xiagang 下岗) workers
peaked, nearly half (48.7%) of all dibao recipients were laid-off, retired, or
unemployed. (35) Also, in 2002 Athar Hussain recorded that “a large percent-
age” of the dibaohu “are able and willing to work but have no jobs.” (36)
But not long thereafter, a decline ensued in the availability of relief for
people able to work. Already in 2004, the World Bank wrote that laid-off
workers accounted for only around 40% of total recipients. (37) By mid-year,
an opinion published in Chinese Civil Affairs (Zhongguo minzheng 中国民
政), the official journal of the Ministry of Civil Affairs (the unit responsible
for the dibao), suggested that whether a person had labour ability and the
will to work, along with the nature of the cause for the loss of labour ability,
should be taken into account in deciding whether to offer the dibao. (38) In
that same year, most cities began implementing “activation measures” en-
couraging healthy recipients to take jobs (although at that time a “reluc-
tance” was reported from recipients “to [go to work and thus] stop receiving
social assistance coverage”). (39) By 2009, the registered and unregistered
unemployed (essentially, the once-xiagang) together accounted for only
39% of all dibao subjects nationwide (a drop of nearly 20 percentage points
in just seven years since 2002; this proportion had declined to 38% by the
second quarter of 2015 (40)).
Writing about 2009, Li and Sicular quote from the annual report of the
Ministry of Civil Affairs, which listed the main dibao beneficiaries in urban
areas as being the unemployed, the elderly without pensions, and children,
who together accounted for over 70% of all recipients. (41) But the unem-
ployed portion no doubt was not composed of people who were simply job-
less by that point, but probably included individuals beset by other issues
of deprivation. Thus, a 2009 World Bank report commented that as of the
time of its preparation, “In practice only those unable to work are likely to
be provided with long-term assistance.” (42) At that point, however, state re-
luctance to underwrite the able-bodied was just a tendency, not an order.
Since 2009, the central government has been formalising this modifica-
tion, ordering that localities arrange for impoverished individuals capable
of doing so to turn to the labour market to sustain themselves – irrespective
of whether that market has a place for them, which, my interviews have re-
vealed, it often does not. And in fall 2011, county welfare officials told a
Sichuan township of a new local disqualification for the dibao for anyone
living with employable adult children. (43) More and more over time, and
now explicitly in a formal directive, being capable of labouring (and in some
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cases, even having family members capable of working) disqualifies one
from the allowance.
Fieldwork supports this altered slant. In 2012 Wuhan interviews, community
officials mentioned a new stringency greeting applications. As one explained: 
A person who is under 50 years of age and has work ability can’t get
the dibao now; the policy has become very strict. If s/he can’t find
work, that’s not a condition for getting the dibao. We encourage
them to go work. (44)
In another Wuhan community, the dibao manager asserted:
Now it’s almost impossible for a healthy laid-off person to get the
dibao. Only the seriously ill and disabled can get it. Getting the al-
lowance depends on age and ability to work; it’s only for the old,
weak, those with ill health, and the disabled. If one has working abil-
ity, he’s unlikely to get it. In the past, the policy was more relaxed
and there were lots of laid-off people [receiving it]. (45)
In Shanghai in 2013, a 72-year-old woman with two grown daughters ex-
plained, “If you have work ability you have to work, unless you’re a veteran,
child, or disabled.” (46)
By late 2014, informants in various places concurred with this information.
In Beijing, Tang Jun, the foremost dibao scholar in China, noted, “Around
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Urban nationwide average 
disposable income
National urban average dibao norm
Average urban dibao norm 
(as % of average disposable income)
2003 8,472 1,788 21
2004 9,422 1,824 19
2005 10,493 1,872 18
2006 11,760 2,035 17
2007 13,786 2,189 16
2008 15,781 2,464 15.6
2009 17,175 2,734 16
2010 19,190 3,014 15.8
2011 21,810 3,451 15.8
2012 24,565 3,961 16
2013 26,955 4,476 16.6
2014 28,844 4,932 17
2015 31,195 5,268 16.88
(unit=yuan/year)
Source: For average disposable income, Zhongguo tongji nianjian, various years, online from China Data Online, selected years. For dibao expenditures, cf. table 2; For 2015: for
average dibao per person per month, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-01/25/c_128666296.htm; (accessed on 8 November 2016); for average disposable income in
2015, see http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201602/t20160229_1323991.html (accessed on 8 November 2016).
2010, the policy got tighter with regard to the able-bodied.” Scholars in
Wuhan related, “Recently we especially care about work ability.” More con-
firmation comes from a street committee cadre in Lanzhou, who held, “Pol-
icy has gotten stricter…if you have work ability you should work.” And an
interviewee from Heilongjiang observed, “At first the qualifications for the
dibao were easier [to meet], but it’s gotten harder now.” (47) Nailing this
trend down even more securely, an early 2014 State Council Document,
No. 649, “Interim Measures on Social Assistance,” decreed that even for
households in which every adult member was without employment, if all
had labour ability, the responsible locality was to guarantee that at least
one person become employed, not that the family be given an allowance. (48)
Second change: Care for (only) the very neediest 
The second modification is closely related to the first. In 2002, sanwu peo-
ple constituted just 4.5% of total dibao beneficiaries. (49) There was no sep-
arate category for the “disabled” then; perhaps such people were sorted
with the sanwu. By 2009, the disabled and the sanwu, added together, had
jumped to 11.7% of the national total of recipients (2.6 times as large a
percentage as seven years before). (50) Perhaps illuminating this trend is a
2013 remark by a Shanghai social work scholar: “The government fears that
the sanwu feel unstable, so it uses the dibao to keep them quiet.” (51)
These data, combined with the reduced percentage occupied by registered
and unregistered unemployed, appear to bolster a claim that the totally pau-
perised and bereft, plus those physically incompetent to work, began to get
a boost, perhaps at the expense of the able-bodied non-working, who, for
the most part, have been steadily shunted off to depend on their own de-
vices.
Relatedly, in 2010, a street office staff member in Guangzhou admitted: 
The biggest issues facing the dibaohu are illness and employment;
since their age is rather old, and their cultural level fairly low, it’s hard
for them to find appropriate work. (52)
That summer a community leader in Lanzhou reported:
If they have labour ability, then we introduce them to work and train
them. But it’s a nuisance (mafan 麻烦). Their qualifications don’t fit
the job, but they want it anyway and then they get angry. (53)
Or, as conveyed by a 50-year-old Guangzhou recipient, half-paralysed and
suffering from high blood pressure and diabetes, but still yearning to some-
how be gainfully employed: “Because I’m too old and sick, if you were a
boss you wouldn’t look for a 40-plus-year-old sick person, it’s that simple.”
As a one-time state-owned oil depot employee, later laid off, he summed
up the situation of the xiagang thusly: 
Everything requires a high educational background. I only have a pri-
mary school education, so naturally they won’t hire me. Talented
people are numerous, so they won’t take me. You say, go sell things;
that needs start-up money (benqian, 本钱). Private businesspeople
wouldn’t invite us, private bosses have no reason to ask a person who
is both sick and old to work, right? I’ve already tried to find work,
but it’s no use – no one hired me. I’m too old, and I’m sick (...) being
young is much better, that’s the way it is. (54)
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Table 5 – Urban dibao as % of GDP
Source: Calculated from data in Table 1.
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But perhaps the situation has improved more recently? Unfortunately,
there are no statistics on the sort of odd jobs with “flexible” hours these
people might be able to take (sweeping streets, handing out leaflets), which
they often are offered.
The 2014 State Council Document No. 649, however, explicitly mentioned
the “especially difficult” (tekun 特困) poor. Also, in early 2014, introducing
a regulation on social assistance he termed the “first legal document aimed
at coordinating and regulating a fragmentary social assistance system,” Pre-
mier Li Keqiang sustained the priorities of the September 2012 State Council
Opinion, ordering “open, fair, and timely aid for the needy.” His definition
of the needy was strikingly close to the old sanwu population: “the disabled,
the elderly, and minors unable to work and without legal guardians or in-
come.” (55)
The announcements at the National People’s Congress in March 2015 dis-
played similar concerns: the Premier’s “Report on the Work of the Govern-
ment” laid out five major accomplishments achieved in 2014, the fourth
being having “worked on developing a tightly woven and sturdy safety net
to secure and improve living standards.” That securing the people’s liveli-
hood and welfare featured there, even if in fourth place, is not insignificant;
besides, Li mentioned the importance of “ensur[ing] that a cushion is in
place for those most in need.” He went on to disclose a newly-installed ur-
gent-aid system, promising to “implement the temporary-assistance
scheme nationwide, so that people with critical, immediate or special needs
will have somewhere to go for support, and will be able to get that support
straight away.” (56)
And, like Document No. 649, a July 2015 plan further targeted the es-
pecially poor, dividing them into categories, including the seriously ill
or disabled, traditional relief targets, and those who had completely
lost the ability to work. These groups were to receive subsidies from
15 to 40% higher, respectively, than those for the other dibaohu. (57)
Overall, the notification amounted to one more indication that the ex-
tremely desperate were attracting the central government’s special at-
tention.
Third and fourth changes: Supervise and punish the
corrupt; suspiciously count assets
Repeating two more new threads from the State Council 2012 Opinion,
Document No. 649 targeted corruption and misappropriation of dibao
monies by local cadres (third change) as well as falsification by recipients
(fourth change). (58) In the past, reports of misbehaviour in the dibao realm
pinpointed the wrongdoing of dishonest recipients – supposed indigents in
possession of secret earnings from off-the-books employment or receiving
cash from family – who hid their incomes to collect the scant sums the al-
lowance accords while eating in restaurants, driving BMWs, and hiring tutors
for their children. (59)
Focusing on such citizens, the Premier underlined that, “people applying
for or receiving assistance should declare their income and property status
truthfully for verification by local governments.” This accords with yet one
more new demand (the fourth one) in the 2012 Opinion, which calls for
calculating a family’s total assets in testing eligibility for the dibao, along
with its household registration and income. Striking is the parallel these
modifications of the program have with the larger movement to wipe out
graft and corruption that General Secretary Xi is waging on a national
scale.
Added to the effort to track down dishonest dibaohu, lurid tales in the
media now talk more of the misdeeds of grass-roots-level leaders, the third
new issue, and less of the improprieties of the dibaohu. An ongoing issue
since the September 2012 State Council Opinion is cadre corruption, as the
battle against bribery unfolds seemingly unstoppably at higher levels. In his
February 2014 document, Premier Li made pointed reference to welfare of-
ficials’ graft, banning “any group or individual from misappropriating social
assistance funds.” “Swindlers are to be fined up to three times the worth of
the materials and funds” they had wrongly seized, he ordered. (60)
After 2012, the media (official and social) became rife with reports of
wrongdoings by local cadres. In one case, officials refrained from reporting
recipients’ change in financial situation, leading to an issuance of 300 mil-
lion yuan that likely lined the pockets of those in charge. Another report
tells of more than three million instances (renci 人次) in which dibaohu de-
serving funds never saw them delivered. (61) Even worse, 80% of surveyed
households approved for the dibao in five provinces went entirely without
their subsidy, while 60% of those funded were in fact not at the poverty
level, according to a 2014 investigation. (62)
In Henan, nearly 20,000 people in authority flaunted regulations, taking
more than 100,000 yuan in dibao funds for their own purposes. (63) Wuhan
officials at various levels attracted the attention of the disciplinary inspec-
tion organs: a former street-level vice welfare office chief had used his po-
sition to falsely claim dibao cash over 500,000 yuan, then turned it into
wage supplements for his workers, and for renovation and office expenses. 
In just a month’s time, Qinghai, Hainan, and Inner Mongolia sent out a
bulletin stating that they had to take back dibao funds from more than
260,000 people who did not qualify for the cash. Meanwhile, nationwide,
more than 1.5 million people were said to have been wrongly omitted from
the dibao rolls between June 2013 and September 2014. Most egregiously,
in a township under Henan’s Luoyang City, a former civil affairs department
chief was found to have 267 bank deposit books in his possession, all col-
lected from the especially poor masses (who mostly did not have bank ac-
counts), which he had used to misappropriate some 500,000 yuan of these
indigents’ money. Elsewhere, records of residents’ democratic assessment
meetings (which evaluate dibao eligibility) were falsified, as villagers’ rep-
resentatives were discouraged from attending the meetings. In yet addi-
tional instances, cash was claimed to have been given to people who had
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already died. (64) Forging the names of intended recipients was also not un-
common. (65)
The remedy proposed was to make public the names, incomes, and al-
lowance amounts of proper subsidy recipients, plus creating a mechanism
that “the masses” could employ to inquire about dibao affairs, all to fulfil
citizens’ rights to know and supervise. (66) The Internet and official docu-
ments in 2014 and 2015 accentuated the imperative of rigor in combating
township and village administrators’ venality and fraud. In Xianyang City,
for instance, staff allegedly went over every case; in Liuzhou a centre was
set up to check the figures on hand-outs in its jurisdiction. (67) In August
2015, People’s Daily ran a piece demanding that posting beneficiaries’
names become a regular practice. (68) Accordingly, localities even posted
name lists of their dibaohu on the Internet. (69)
Fifth change: Shift to the countryside
The fifth and final switch entails buttressing the benefits of farmers, which
could be a move to shore up legitimacy in these localities, as clashes be-
tween farmers and authorities have been rife. An attempt to placate the
restive rural areas has been official policy for some time, one associated
mainly with the tenure of leaders Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao in the first
decade of the century in their “Socialist Countryside” movement, (70) includ-
ing the 2007 extension of the dibao scheme to the villages.
An unequivocal bent to the countryside with respect to the dibao, how-
ever, began only after 2012. (71) Back in 2008, when the rural dibao was just
being extended nationally, the urban pot of outlays far, far surpassed that
for the countryside (23.34 million urbanites got 38.5 billion yuan, an average
of 1,650 yuan per person per year, while in the countryside, 42.84 million
people shared 22.23 billion yuan, an average of just 520 yuan per person
per year, a mere 31.5% of what an urban recipient was given), and that im-
balance obtained through 2010. In 2011, the sums for the rural and urban
areas were nearly equal, with 66.77 billion yuan going to the rural areas
and 66 billion yuan to the urban poor, despite that the numbers of recipients
in the two regions were vastly different, with 22.8 million in the cities and
53.06 in the countryside.
In 2012, however, 67.43 billion yuan was split up among 21.43 million
urban dwellers, an average of 3,146 yuan per person per year, while 53.44
million rural residents got 71.8 billion yuan, or 1,340 yuan per person per
year. (72) This means that the ratio changed substantially, since a rural
beneficiary thereby received 43% of what an urban one did. And in both
2013 and 2014, the rural areas got larger amounts of funding than did
the urban (86.69 billion yuan and 87 billion for 53.82 million rural poor
people and 52.07 million farmer recipients in 2013 and 2014, respec-
tively).
Meanwhile in the cities, 75.7 billion yuan was allocated in 2013, a fig-
ure that dropped to 72.2 billion yuan in 2014 for 20.6 million and 18.77
million beneficiaries, respectively. This means that in 2014 an average
urban recipient – presuming s/he remained on the allowance the entire
year, which may not have been the case – got 3,846 yuan per year,
while an average rural dibaohu got 1,670 yuan per year, again about
43% of the urban indigent’s take. That is by no means an equalising al-
location, but it is a significant relative improvement for rural recipients
(Tables 1 and 2). 
At the 2015 National People’s Congress, Premier Li’s speech indicated a
rise in importance of the rural dibao program: he pledged to “continue to
raise subsistence allowances for rural and urban residents,” notably naming
those in the countryside first. (73) Li also announced projected increases in
subsistence allowances [the dibao] per person by 9.97% for the urban im-
poverished but by as much as 14.1% for the rural needy. (74) Even if this shift
is aimed purely at narrowing the benefit gap across areas, it embodies a tilt
to the rural areas.
In July 2015, another striking sign emerged that (at least some of) the
rural areas were to be served in a new way: the Chinese News Network
broadcast that many places had equalised the dibao norm in their urban
and rural areas by raising poverty lines to the same level. Although only a
handful of major cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing, Hangzhou, Changsha,
Chengdu, and Hefei) had fulfilled the plan as of mid-year 2015, other cities
were considering the move as they carried out trials or set up experimental
districts. Beijing raised its urban level from 2011’s 480 yuan per person per
month to 710 yuan, an increase of about 50%, while its rural standard rose
more than 133%, from 300 to 710 yuan. It is likely that the “rural areas”
that received this hefty increment were suburban places on the outskirts
of large cities. But the reform is still substantial, even if for a limited clien-
tele.
This decision could conceivably be read as addressing concerns beyond pure
poverty, if one speculates that it is a move to mollify fractious farmers angered
over land dispossessions. Distributing such small sums as the dibao delivers
is unlikely to do much to compensate for a loss of land. Yet policymakers
might see this as a cheap means to signal they have heard the voices of dis-
placed and short-changed villagers. If this reasoning is correct, raising the
dibao is a far simpler palliative than would be restoring confiscated property.
Conclusion
This review of repeated modifications in the management of the poor can
be seen as speaking to the nature of temporal policy adjustment in the Peo-
ple’s Republic; it suggests that in the case of this social policy, even as the
rhetoric targets helping the very poor, the subtext has been to serve con-
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Articles
temporaneous political agendas. Whether this is the case for other public
policies is something for other researchers to test. But to generalise a bit,
as happens not infrequently in China, two or even more sequential – but
different – policies go under one and the same label, as the first initiative
evolves into a second but without its title being altered. I argue that in this
case this was done to match larger switches in governmental priorities over
time. It is as if the project is in a sense turned into an available shell into
which new objectives could be poured.
Thus, a program originally installed to appease protesting proletarians
in the cities – which, it was hoped, could replace the benefits proffered
by the defunct danwei – has morphed back into a project targeted pri-
marily at the old sanwu. This it has achieved as it bars people who in the-
ory could do some labour (despite the market often not having much on
offer). It has also been made to echo a larger effort at eliminating graft in
the upper echelons of power. And at last the program has swerved its
thrust away from the cities where it was born and into the countryside,
again, quite possibly, in a plan aimed at pacifying instability. Put another
way, this study illustrates how the regime has reshaped one initiative to
match the changing political objectives of the Party. It has done so by
elaborating upon five substantial shifts in the program’s priorities over
time: with regard to its principal target (now only the old sanwu); in set-
ting up requirements that the labour-able must work; in sniffing out cor-
ruption among both local leaders and recipients; and in privileging the
countryside over the cities.
Thus, in line with the obsession with corrupt behaviour that characterises
the rule of Xi Jinping, the past several years have seen the Minimum Liveli-
hood Guarantee training much of its aim on malfeasance, in this case gen-
erally in the form of “flies” at the grassroots who must be swatted, not at
the big-time “tigers” at or near the top of the polity who might be put to
death. The demand that the physically firm go to work, and the turn toward
the countryside of late are also arms of more powerful national priorities.
The bottom line is that this social assistance and welfare program, despite
its propaganda, is meant to do much more than just target the poor. The
larger implication for the poverty-stricken is that their cause has been
downgraded in the interest of other goals.
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